C. S. Lewis's Approach to the Supernatural Reality
C. S. ルイスの護教論

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‹Introduction›

C. S. Lewis (1899–1963), a fellow in English Language and Literature at Magdalen, College Oxford and, later, the first Professor of Medieval and Renaissance English Literature at Cambridge University, was one of the most influential Christian lay advocates this century. As well as literary criticism, he published a lot of Christian apologetic works, children's literature, science fictions, and a novel.

Lewis believes in God as the supernatural, absolute Reality, who is transcendental of our spatio-temporal world. He also believes in heaven as the world of objective reality, or the Real World, with his conviction that "Heaven is reality itself. All that is fully real is Heavenly." (*Divorce*, p. 69) The world of reality is, for Lewis, the world of meaning. As Robert Houston Smith says, "The term best suited to describe Lewis's philosophy of religion is objectivism." He sees "the phenomenal world as standing in relation to absolute reality."[1] Yet what is especially characteristic of Lewis is the fact that he not only believes in the world of objective reality but also loves it, yearns for it, and thinks that man can actually attain that reality in heaven and become a part of it.

He also believes in the rationality and intelligibility of the universe. This belief is in fact a belief in the rationality both of man and the universe, since it assumes not only the logos of the universe but the validity of human reason as a means of logically knowing that logos. It had been one of the most important fundamental presuppositions in Western philosophy until modern times. For instance, St. Thomas Aquinas assumes the explicable order of the cosmos as an axiom and bases his argument for the existence of God on it:

> Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must be traced back to God as to its first cause. So likewise whatever is done voluntarily must be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason and will, since these can change and fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle.[2]

He takes it for granted that every existence and every movement has its causes and infers the existence of God thus:

> [W]hatever is moved must be moved by another. If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also must needs be moved by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity,

> because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover, seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is moved by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other. And this everyone understands to be God.[3]

As late as the 18th century, Samuel Clarke still believed that everything that exists has a sufficient reason:

> [T]o say a thing is produced, and yet that there is no cause at all of that production, is to say that something is effected when it is effected by nothing; that is, at the same time when it is not effected at all. Whatever exists has a cause, a reason, a ground of its existence (a foundation on which its existence relies, a ground or reason why it does exist rather than not exist) either in the necessity of its own nature, and then it must have been of itself eternal, or in the will of some other being...[4]

Lewis deems himself to be an "Old Western man"[5] and shares this belief in the logos of the universe with those philosophers who are in the medieval tradition. Not all philosophers believe this; for example, David Hume in the 18th century positively denied the necessity of inferring an explanatory cause of the existence of the world. Hume argues especially against the so called design argument prevalent in his days that explains the natural order by tracking its cause to a prior order existing in the mind of the Creator. He asks, "Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? But if we stop...why not stop at the material world?"[6]

According to Lewis, the decisive historical break between the Middle Ages and today lies after "the age of Jane Austen and Scott."[7] The world today has come into the "post-Christian"[8] era, where people believing and practicing Christianity are in the minority. In this age of science, he finds that the materialistic, naturalistic world view which excludes anything supernatural is so strong that it even undermines belief in the supernatural Reality of God. He also finds that modern technological progress has so affected general sentiments and value judgment that many people today simply tend to regard the newer things as better, whatever things they may be. Lewis says,

> [O]ur assumption that everything is provisional and soon to be superseded, that the attainment of goods we have never yet had, rather than the defence and conservation of those we have already, is the cardinal business of life would most shock and bewilder them [i.e. our ancestors] if they could visit ours [i.e. our world.][9]

Even in the field of ethics, in which there used to be unchangeable objective standards of good and evil, many people have come now to see only some relative standards or subjective opinions.

One of Lewis's greatest characteristics is his belief in an absolute objective value, which is thought to have come from God. In this he is in fact on the older side of the division. For him, the pursuit of good is not any subjective conduct. It is progress towards the unchangeable objective

Good by the absolute standards of value. These beliefs are all connected with his belief in the existence of a God who is the ultimate Reality and the Absolute Good. Lewis is well known as an advocate of Christianity, but I should rather call him an advocate of objective reality. He not only argues for the objective existence of God and heaven, but also for the objectivity of the moral law that he finds to be an absolute reality. In literary criticism, he insists on the value of allegory and myth, because he believes these reveal metaphysical meanings and realities. Above all, his fictions and stories are fascinating expressions of his ideas of how man may yearn for and attain that reality.

Though he finds that God is supernatural and transcendental of our world of ordinary experience, he believes that God reveals Himself as well as ultimate Reality through our reason, imagination and moral consciousness. Therefore, in this thesis, we shall discuss how he thinks man may perceive both a supernatural God and Reality through these three faculties of reason, imagination and morality.

Since in this study the word "Reality" and "Real" are so important as God's attribute, we shall use them especially in referring to God or to the metaphysical world of God, the world of objective reality.

Notes

‹Texts by Lewis and their Abbreviations›

Abolition: The Abolition of Man: Reflections on Education with Special Reference to the Teaching of English in the Upper Forms of Schools. Macmillan, 1947; paperbacks, 1955.

Allegory: The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition. Oxford Univ. Press, 1936; paperbacks, 1958; rpt. 1977.

Boxen: Boxen: The Imaginary World of the Young C. S. Lewis. Ed. and with an introduction by Walter Hooper. Collins, paperbacks, 1985.

Caspian: Prince Caspian: The Return to Narnia. 1951; Penguin, 1962; rpt. 1975.

Christian Reflections: Christian Reflections. Ed. Walter Hooper. Eerdmans, 1967; rpt. 1982.

Concerns: Present Concerns: Ethical Essays. Ed. Walter Hooper. Collins, paperbacks, 1986.

Dark Tower: The Dark Tower & Other Stories. Ed. Walter Hooper. Harcourt, 1977.

Dawn Treader: The Voyage of the Down Treader. 1952; Penguin, 1965; rpt. 1976.

Discarded: The Discarded Image: An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1964; paparbacks, 1967.

Divorce: The Great Divorce. Macmillan, paperbacks, 1946.

English Literature in the 16th Century: English Literature in the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama. vol. III of The Oxford History of English Literature, Oxford Univ. Press, 1954; paperbacks, 1973.

Essays Presented to Charles Williams: Lewis, C. S. ed. *Essays Presented to Charles Williams.* 1947; Eerdmans, paperbacks, 1966; rpt. 1981.

Eyperiment: An Experiment in Criticism. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1961; rpt. 1976.

Four Loves: The Four Loves. 1960; rpt. Collins, Fount Paperbacks, 1977.

God: God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics. Ed. Walter Hooper. Eerdmans, 1970.

Grief: A Grief Observed. Faber and Faber, 1961; paperbacks, 1966; rpt. 1978.

Hideous: That Hideous Strength: A Modern Fairy-Tale for Grown-Ups. 1946; Macmillan, paperbacks, 1965.

Horse: The Horse and his Boy. 1954; Penguin, 1965; rpt. 1975.

Joy: Surprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life. 1955; Collins, 1959; paperbacks, 1977.

Last Battle: The Last Battle. 1956; Penguin, 1964; rpt.1976.

Letters to Children: Letters to Children. eds. Lyle W. Dorsett and Marjorie Lamp Mead. Collins, 1985; paperbacks, 1986.

Letters: Letters of C. S. Lewis. Ed. with a Memoir, by W. H. Lewis. Harcourt, 1966

Letters to Arthur: The Letters of C. S. Lewis to Arthur Greeves (1914—1963): Originally titled *They Stand Together.* Ed. Walter Hooper. 1979; Macmillan,1986.

Letters to an American Lady: Letters to an American Lady. Ed. Clyde S. Kilby. Eerdmans, 1967; paperbacks, 1971; rpt. 1982.

Lion: The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe. 1950; Penguin, 1959; rpt. 1976.

Magician's: The Magician's Nephew. 1955; Penguin, 1963; rpt. 1976.

Malcolm: Letters to Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer. Harcourt, 1963.

Mere Christianity: Mere Christianity. 1952; Collins, 1955; paperbacks, 1977.

Miracles: Miracles: A Preliminary Study. 1947; Collins, paperbacks, 1960.

Narrativa Poems: Narrative Poems. Ed. Walter Hooper. 1969; Harcourt, 1979.

On Stories: On Stories and Other Essays on Literature. Ed. Walter Hooper. Harcourt, 1982.

Pain: The Problem of Pain. 1940; Collins, 1957; paperbacks, 1977.

Perelandra: Perelandra: A Novel. 1944; Macmillan, paperbacks, 1965.

Personal Heresy: The Personal Heresy: A Controversy, with E.M.W. Tillyard. Oxford Univ. Press, 1939; paperbacks, 1965.

Poems: Poems. Ed. Walter Hooper. 1964; Harcourt, paperbacks, 1977.

Preface: A Preface to 'Paradise Lost'. Oxford Univ. Press, 1942; paperbacks, 1960; rpt. 1979.

Psalms: Reflections on the Psalms. Harcourt, 1958.

Regress: The Pilgrim's Regress: An Allegorical Apology for Christianity, Reason, and Romanticism. 1933; rpt. with a new preface, notes and running headlines, 1943; Eerdmans, 1958; rpt. 1982.

Screwtape: The Screwtape Letters. 1942; Collins, 1955; paperbacks, 1977.

Selected Essays: Selected Literary Essays. Ed. Walter Hooper. London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969; paperbacks, 1979.

Silent Planet: Out of the Silent Planet. 1938; Macmillan, paperbacks, 1965.

Silver Chair: The Silver Chair. 1953; Penguin, 1965; rpt. 1974. paperbacks, 1977; rpt. 1979.

Spirits: Spirits in Bondage: A Cycle of Lyrics. Ed. Walter Hooper, Harcourt, paperbacks, 1984.

Studies: Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1966; paperbacks, 1979; rpt. 1980.

Spenser's: Spencer's Images of Life. Ed. Alastair Fowler. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967;

Till We: Till We Have Faces: A Myth Retold. 1956; Harcourt, paperbacks, 1980.

Timeless: Timeless At Heart: Essays on Theology. Ed. Walter Hooper. 1970; Collins, paperbacks, 1987.

Toast: Screwtape Proceses a Toast and Other Pieces. 1965; Collins, 1965; paperbacks, 1977.

Words: Studies in Words. 2nd ed. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967; rpt. 1972.

World's: The World's Last Night and Other Essays. Harcourt, 1960.

‹Footnotes›

1. Robert Houston Smith, *Patches of God-light* (University of Geogia Press, 1981), pp 12–13.
2. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Marietti, 1952, Prima Pars, Quaestio II. p. 13; The translation from W. Rawe & Wainwright eds., *Philosophy of Religion*, second edition, Harcourt, 1989; p. 129.
3. Aquinas, *Summa*, Prima Pars, Quaestio II. p. 12; The translation from W. Rawe & Wainwright eds., *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 130.
4. Samuel Clarke, Propotions I, in *Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God*, ninth edition. quoted in W. Rawe & Wainwright eds., *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 138. Punctuation, use of capitals, etc., have been modernized by the editors.
5. Lewis, "*De Descriptione Temporum*'," *Selected Essays*, p. 14.
6. David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, ed. J. J. Prince, Oxford, 1976. pp. 34–35.
7. Lewis, "*De Descriptione Temporum*'," *Selected Essays*, p. 14.
8. Lewis, "*De Descriptione Temporum*'," *Selected Essays*, p. 7.
9. Lewis, "*De Descriptione Temporum*'," *Selected Essays*, p. 10.

Chapter I
Imagination

‹Joy›

In 1954, in a letter to the Milton Society of America, Lewis says that he is intrinsically an imaginative man.

> The imaginative man in me is older, more continuously operative, and in that sense more basic than either the religious writer or the critic. It was he who made me first attempt (with little success) to be a poet. It was he who, in response to the poetry of others, made me a critic, and, in defence of that response, sometimes a critical controversialist. It was he who after my conversion led me to embody my religious belief in symbolical or mythopeic forms...And it was of course he who has brought me, in the last few years, to write the series of Narnian stories for children...(*Letters*, p. 260)

The imagination he sees thus in himself appears to be a synonym for the "creativity" that we

expect of good writers and artists. Actually, however, this "imagination" means a lot more than mere creativity. For Lewis, it is also the power of intuition into the metaphysical reality of this world and of heaven, and the power of communication of that reality.

He attributes such intuitive power to the human imagination because what convinces him of the existence of heaven is his recurrent aesthetic experiences that he calls "Joy", which has been the greatest concern in his imaginative life. Since he was a child, he has occasionally been struck by an aesthetic sensation which is very similar to what we see in Proust's famous madeleine experience in *A la recherche du tempus perdu.* It is a sensation of an extraordinary, indescribable longing caused by quite ordinary things in life. It is numinous because the very person who has felt the longing cannot specify what he really longs for.

In his autobiography, *Surprised by Joy,* Lewis describes his childhood experiences of "Joy". Its origin goes back to the time when he was around five years old. One day his elder brother Warren made a toy garden in a biscuit tin and showed it to him. He remembers it as the first beauty he had ever experienced.

> What the real garden had failed to do, the toy garden did. It made me aware of nature- not, indeed, as a storehouse of forms and colours but as something cool, dewy, fresh, exuberant. I do not think the impression was very important at the moment. But it soon became important in memory. (*Joy,* p. 12)

He says, "As long as I live my imagination of Paradise will retain something of my brother's toy garden." (Ibid.)

The next thing that he remembers in connection with "Joy" is the line of the Castlereagh Hills which he saw from his nursery window. Lewis says that those hills, which were far enough to be unattainable to the children, taught him longing or *"Sehnsucht."* (Ibid.)

The sense of beauty and of longing either in the toy garden or in the hills may be called incipient "Joys". However, Lewis does not count them as actual "Joy" experiences. The first true experience of"Joy" came a few years later when he was eight or nine years old. It was also a sensation of longing mixed with a sense of beauty, but it was far keener than those he had had before. There are three incidents that he gives us as examples of his "Joy" experiences.

The first was what he calls "the memory of a memory," that was the memory of that toy garden which his brother had shown him. The memory struck Lewis quite suddenly when he was standing beside a flowering currant bush. He describes the experience, saying that it made everything else seem insignificant in comparison:

> It is difficult to find words strong enough for the sensation which came over me; Milton's "enormous bliss" of Eden (giving the full, ancient meaning to "enormous") comes somewhere near it. It was a sensation, of course of desire; but desire for what? not, certainly, for biscuit tin filled with moss, nor even (though that came into it) for my own past. *'Ιο ν λ ι α ν π ο θ ω* *—and before I knew what I desired, the desire itself was gone, the whole glimpse withdrawn, the world turned commonplace again, or only stirred by a longing for the longing that had just ceased.
> (*Oh, I desire too much) (*Joy,* p.19)

The second experience of "Joy" came to him through *Squirrel Nutkin*, a nursery book by Beatrix Potter.

> [I]t administered the shock, it was a trouble. It troubled me with what I can only describe as the Idea of Autumn. It sounds fantastic to say that one can be enamoured of a season, but that is something like what happened; and, as before, the experience was one of intense desire. (*Joy*, p. 19)

The third one was through poetry. When he was reading Longfellow's *Saga of King Oraf*, he came upon an unrhymed translation of Tegner's *Drapa* and was strongly moved by the lines:

> I heard a voice that cried,
> Balder the beautiful
> Is dead, is dead. (quot. in *Joy*, p. 20)

He writes about the experience,

> I knew nothing about Balder; but instantly I was uplifted into huge regions of northern sky, I desired with almost sickening intensity something never to be described...and then, as in the other examples, found myself at the very same moment already falling out of that desire and wishing I were back in it. (*Joy*, p. 20)

He has got the impression that "Joy" is always "unsatisfied desire which is itself more desirable than any other satisfaction." (*Joy*, p. 20) In this context, then, "Joy" is different from both "Happiness" and "Pleasure":

> Joy (in my sense) has indeed one characteristic and one only, in common with them; the fact that anyone who has experienced it will want it again. Apart from that, and considered only its quality, it might almost equally well be called a particular kind of unhappiness or grief...I doubt whether anyone who has tasted it would ever, if both were in his power exchange it for all the pleasures in the world. But then Joy is never in our power and pleasure often is. (*Joy*, p 20)

From what we have seen, the main characteristics of "Joy" can be summarised as follows: 1) that it is a sensation of keen desire; 2) that one cannot know or control when and where it comes or vanishes away; 3) that it suggests some incalculable importance especially when remembered afterwards; 4) that the object of the desire is other than the immediate cause of it and can never be specified. 5) That the desire is never satisfied, and that 6) The desire itself turns to be the object of the desire. It becomes "a longing for the longing." (*Joy*, p. 19)

An unsatisfied desire would usually cause a sense of unhappiness, but it is otherwise with the way the "Joy" works on Lewis. Lewis's eager pursuit of "Joy" began sometimes between 1911 and 1913, when he read about a Wagnerian version of *the Nibelung Saga*. What attracted him to Wagner's Siegfried was, initially, nothing but a headline in a literary periodical, which runs as "Siegfried and the Twilight of the Gods", with an illustration by Arthur Rackham.

Around that time he had a feeling that he had lost "Joy", because he had not had a "Joy" experience for quite a long time. But the headline and illustration together brought about such a strong sensation of "Joy" that he felt as if "The sky had turned round." (*Joy*, p. 62)

When he was first impressed by Wagner and his saga through the headline, he knew Nothing about Wagner or about Siegfried, and he mistook the "Twilight of the Gods" for the twilight in which the gods lived. Yet somehow the "Northernness" about it fascinated him. It has the same moving power as he had found in Longfellow's lines. He says,

> I knew...that Siegfried...belonged to the same world as Balder and the sunward-sailing cranes. And with that plunge back into my own past there arose at once, almost like heartbreak, the memory of Joy itself, the knowledge that I had once had what I had now lacked for years, that I was returning at last from exile and desert lands to my own country...And at once I knew (with fatal knowledge) that to "have it again" was the supreme and only important object of desire. (*Joy*, pp. 62–63)

Since Lewis did not know the source of "Joy", his concern is divided into two, that is, to know the source, or the true object, of Joy, and to seize as many a catalyst to arouse"Joy" as possible. And though anything that had ever caused "Joy" did not always do so, he found that Wagnerian *Nibelung* gave him "Joy" more than anything else.

Once he came to have "Joy" again, its pursuit became a matter of such a special significance that, in *Surprised by Joy*, he distinguishes it from every other aspect of life and calls it the "imaginative life." Many things that are ordinarily regarded as imaginative, such as most of reading and erotic or ambitious fancies, do not belong to what he calls "imaginative life." His "imaginative life" is only that part of the inner life which is concerned with "Joy". (*Joy*, pp. 66–67)

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In the history of English literature, the most well-known poets who have made much of imagination as one of the highest human faculties are the Romantics such as Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, and Keats, most of whom are usually considered as modern rather than classical writers, though not very modern. It is interesting that Lewis as an imaginative man shares many characteristics with the Romantic poets while he himself describes himself as a medieval "dinosaur." ("*'De Descriptione Temporum'*," *Selected Essays*, p. 14) He is a Romantic as well as a medieval man, and in him the two aspects do not clash to exclude each other.

Experiences similar to his "Joy" are common to many English Romantics as we shall see. However, since his expreience is probably most similar to Proust's or rather to the narrator's madeleine experience in Proust's *À la recherche du tempus perdu*, we may as well glance at the passage where the narrator, on tasting a crumb of madeleine soaked in tea, is struck by a sudden strange sensation which is so strong that it stops him and makes him think about its essence and meaning.

Mais à l'instant même où la gorgée mêlée des miettes du gâteau toucha mon palais, je tressaillis, attentif à ce qui se passait d'extraordinaire en moi. Un plaisir délicieux m'avait envahi, isolé, sans la notion de sa cause. Il m'avait aussitôt rendu les vicissitudes de la vie indifférentes, ses désastres inoffensifs, sa brièveté illusoire, de la même façon qu'opère l'amour, en me remplissant d'une essence précieuse: ou plutôt cette essence n'était pas en moi, elle était moi. J'avais cessé de me sentir médiocre, contingent, mortel. D'où avait pu me venir cette puissante joie?...Je sentais qu'elle était liée au goût du thé et du gâteau, mais qu'elle le dépassait infiniment, ne devait pas être de même nature. D'où venait-elle? Que signifiait-elle? Où l'appréhender?...Il est clair que la vérité que je cherche n'est pas en [le breuvage], mais en moi.

(No sooner had the warm liquid, and the crumbs with it, touched my palate than a shudder ran through my whole body, and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary changes that were taking place. An exquisite pleasure had invaded my senses, but individual, detached, with no suggestion of its origin. And at once the vicissitudes of life had become indifferent to me, its disasters innocuous, its brevity illusory—this new sensation having had on me the effect which love has of filling me with a precious essence; or rather this essence was not in me, it was myself. I had ceased now to feel mediocre, accidental, mortal. Whence could it have come to me, this all-powerful joy? I was conscious that it was connected with the taste of tea and cake, but that it infinitely transcended those savours, could not, indeed, be of the same nature as theirs. Whence did it come? What did it signify? How could I seize upon and define it?...It is plain that the object of my quest, the truth, lies not in the cup but in myself.)[1]

In this as well as in Lewis's "Joy", the sensation is that of strong joy. It comes so sudden without any warning as if it were from another world. In both cases it is incomprehensible and evasive. And though the sensation has lasted only a moment it leaves such a strong impression of profound meaning on the mind that the pursuit of its meaning becomes the greatest concern afterwards. Proust's experience is almost the same as Lewis's.

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In the preface to *The Pilgrim's Regress: An Allegorical Apology for Christianity, Reason and Romanticism*, Lewis describes his "Joy" as "romantic." (*Regress*, p. 5) In that preface, he classifies what may be called "romantic" into seven categories: 1) Stories about dangerous adventure, e.g., stories by Dumas. 2) Marvellous happenings apart from the received religion. Malory, Boiardo, Ariosto, Spenser, Tasso, Mrs. Radcliffe, Shelley, Coleridge, William Morris, and Mr. E. R. Eddison are "romantic" authors in this sense. 3) The art dealing with Titanic characters, emotions strained beyond the common pitch, and high flown sentiments or codes of honour, as found, for example, in the works of Rostand, Sidney, Corneille, Dryden's heroic dramas and, in sculpture, Michelangelo. 4) The indulgence in abnormal, or anti-natural, *Macabre* moods as in the works of Poe, Baudelaire, Flaubert, and Surrealists. 5) Egoism and subjectivism, as found in Goethe's *Werther*, Rousseau's *Confessions*, and the works of Byron and Proust. 6) Revolt against existing civilization and conventions in writers such as pseudo-Ossian, Epstein, D. H. Lawrence, Walt Whitman, and Wagner, and 7) Sensibility to natural objects, when solemn and enthusiastic, as typified by Wordsworth's *Prelude*. Keats, Shelley, de Vigny, de Musset and Goethe are also "romantic". (*Regress*, pp. 5–6)

With this classification, he emphasizes that the romanticism he is concerned with in *The Pilgrim's Regress* is different from any of these but that it refers to the "intense longing" which was the "particular recurrent experience which dominated [his] childhood and adolescence." (*Regress*, p. 7) On the other hand, however, his "Joy" is not totally alien to what would usually pass for the "romantic." As it has a lot in common with the madeleine experience in Proust, so has it also some quality in common with the English Romantics' concern.

Wordsworth, for example, has similar experiences to Lewis's "Joy" when he turns to Nature, having seen the violent anarchy in France after the Revolution and while suffering from loss of faith in human dignity. In Wordsworth's case, the aesthetic feelings strike him mainly when he remembers certain significant experiences in his childhood. He refers to such moments as "spots of time", finding a reviving power in them.

> There are in our existence spots of time,
> Which with distinct pre-eminence retain
> A vivifying Virtue, whence, depress'd
> By false opinion and contentious thought,
> Or aught of heavier or more deadly weight
> In trivial occupations, and the round
> Of ordinary intercourse, our minds
> Are nourished and invisibly repair'd...
> Such moments, worthy of all gratitude,
> Are scattered everywhere, taking their date
> From our first childhood.
> (*Prelude*, 1805, XI, 258–276)[2]

In such "spots of time", he feels mutual communion of man and Nature, in which we are revealed something essential to human dignity.

> ...in life's everyday appearance
> I seem'd about this period to have sight
> Of a new world, a world, too, that was fit
> To be transmitted and made visible
> To other eyes, as having for its base
> That whence our dignity originates,
> That which both gives it being, and maintains
> A balance, and ennobling interchange
> Of action from within and from without,
> The excellence, pure spirit, and best power
> Both of the object seen, and eye that sees.
> (*Prelude*, 1805, XII, 369–379)[3]

James Joyce also writes about sudden revelations of hitherto unseen significance in ordinary matters. He treats it as a main theme in *Ulyses* and *Steven Hero*, and refers to the experience as an "epiphany". It is a moment in which a thing reveals its essence to man, when

"Its soul, its whatness leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance."[4]

Now what is important about Lewis is that though in all the four writers above, Proust, Wordsworth, Joyce, and Lewis, the moment of revelation of hidden meaning in ordinary things becomes a matter of the greatest importance, it is Lewis alone that has come to interpret the sense of revelation as something that is given by the supernatural God to lead man to Christianity. M. H. Abrams, discussing romanticism in such authors as Proust and Wordsworth, says in his *Natural Supernaturalism*,

> [T]he general tendency was, in divers degrees and ways, to naturalize the supernatural and to humanize the divine....The Romantic enterprise was an attempt to sustain the inherited cultural order against what to many writers seemed the imminence of chaos...[5]

His argument is that the Romantic poets turn to imagination for the means to get over alienation of man from Nature, or from the world in general, that they dream recovery of Paradise through the power of imagination. He includes T. S. Eliot in the Romantic poets as well. In Eliot's *Four Quarters*, Abrams points out, the rose garden at the beginning of "Burnt Norton" is associated with the peace and innocence of man's infancy. It is an image of the lost paradise.

> The rest of *Four Quarters* is the exploration of the multiple significance of this obsessive image, figured as a spiritual quest, by land and sea and underground, for the lost but unforgotten garden.[6]

This quest ends with the reconciliation of all oppositions, symbolized by the reconciliation of "the past and future" in "Incarnation."[7] Such a reconciliation of opposites in an ex-temporal dimension is a recovery of the paradise which the narrator has long sought for. In *Four Quarters*, Abrams sees a description of its own poetic formation in a circular journey, but at the same time, he also sees a Christian type of the Prodigal Son. The spiritual quest in that poems is a journey back towards the recognition of the garden at the beginning of "Burnt Norton." He says that "the conspicuous difference, of course, is that Eliot's version of the Romantic genre of the artist's self-formative progress is also a reversion to its Christian prototype, the Augustinian peregrinatio vitae."[8] (Abrams, p. 322) Eliot is then different from those Romantics who pursue their ideal within this three-dimensional world apart from Christianity. In *Four Quarters*, for example, the timeless world which is seen through the temporal is important not as a recovered paradise on earth but as a metaphysical heaven.

Here, Lewis is nearer to Eliot than to Wordsworth in that he also regards the world which "Joy" seems to be pointing at as an eternal world of heaven, which is beyond this spatio-temporal world. Though the concept of God can also be seen in Wordsworth's *Prelude*, and the significance in Joyce's "epiphany" is metaphysical, Proust, Wordsworth and Joyce find the significance actually in this universe where they live, or to put it more precisely, within the relationship between the universe and the man who perceives its mystery. They are, in this sense, all man-centred, while Lewis's idea of "Joy" is God-centred. He interprets "Joy" as a

"signpost" to lead man to God, and to His country. (*Joy*, p. 190)

To see the difference more closely, in Proust's case, the narrator finds the meaning of the sensation he has got from the cake in the fact that, in the memory of such a strong sensation, he holds in him the past and present simultaneously; for memory is a common region between the past and the present. This is significant for Proust as a poet because the recovery of the past memory has in it something similar to the recovery of a lost paradise, which he finds valuable enough to take up as the main theme of his greatest work. He even finds his identity as a poet in that recovery.

> Oui, si le souvenir, grâce à l'oubli, n'a pu contracter aucun lien, jeter aucun chaînon entre lui et la minute présente,...il nous fait tout à coup respirer un air nouveau, précisément parce que c'est un air qu'on a respiré autrefois...car les vrais paradis sont les paradis qu'on a perdus. ...la cause de cette félicité du caractére de certitude avec lequel elle s'imposait...cette cause, je la devinais en comparant ces diverses impressions bienheureuses et qui avaient entre elles ceci de commun que je les éprouvais à la fois dans le moment actuel et dans un moment éloigné,...au vrai, l'être qui alors goûtait en moi cette impression la goûtait en ce qu'elle avait de commun dans un jour ancien et maintenant, dans ce qu'elle avait d'extra-temporel...
>
> (Yes: if, owing to the work of oblivion, the returning memory can throw no bridge, form no connecting link between itself and the present minute...it causes us suddenly to breathe a new air, an air which is new precisely because we have breathed it in the past...since the true paradises are the paradises that we have lost....the cause of this felicity which I had just experienced,...the character of the certitude with which it imposed itself....this cause I began to divine as I compared these diverse happy impressions, diverse yet with this in common, that I experienced them at the present moment and at the same time in the context of a distant moment...The truth surely was that the being within me which had enjoyed these impressions had enjoyed them because they had in them something that was common to a day long past and to the present, because in some way they were extra-temporal...)[9]

Georges Poulet points out that the phenomenon of what we call "memory" was a discovery of the 18th century. Since that time, philosophers have come to realize that a man's consciousness of his own existence depends not only on his present sensations but also on the memory of his past sensations and experiences. The characteristic of the early Romantics is, according to Poulet, the consciousness that our existence consists of two lives: the life at the present moment and the life in our memory. We live these two lives simultaneously. However, those early Romantics also have found that we human beings are almost incapable of remembering and expressing the essential part of our experience.[10]

In such a course of the history of the concept of time and memory, it is natural that a twentieth-century writer should be eager to know the meaning of his aesthetic experience. The fact that Proust recognizes his own identity in that recollected experience rather than in his present self is typical of such Romantics as are discussed by Poulet in that Proust in his recognition regards his past experiences as a part of his present existence.

On the other hand, Lewis has never thought that the aesthetic experience of his "Joy" has anything to do with his personal identity, or with his *raison d'être* as a writer. The recollected

experience has never seemed to him important because it has influence upon his present consciousness or upon his present self. The glory of remembered beauty is, to Lewis, a foretaste of resurrection.

> ...the glorified body of the resurrection as I conceive it—the sensuous life raised from its death—will be inside the soul. As God is not in space but space is in God....Wordsworth's landscape "apparelled in celestial light" may not have been so radiant in the past when it was present as in the remembered past. That is the beginning of the glorification....Thus in the sense-bodies of the redeemed the whole New Earth will arise. The same, yet not the same, as this. It was sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption. (*Malcolm*, p. 122)

Lewis is aware of the similarity and difference between other Romantics and himself. For instance, he finds Wordsworth's "spots of time" to be similar to his experience of "Joy", while he also sees Wordsworth is different from him in his final attitudes towards such aesthetic experiences. He criticizes Wordsworth for clinging too much to the memory of the past emotion, remarking that he mistakes the pointer for the real object.

> Wordsworth, I believe, made this mistake all his life. I am sure that all that sense of the loss of vanished vision which fills *The Prelude* was itself vision of the same kind, if only he could have believed it. (*Joy*, p. 135)

Of course, *The Prelude* is far more than a mere lamentation for the lost feelings. Wordsworth eventually finds comfort and recovers his mental health in the communion with Nature. Yet, Lewis thinks Wordsworth should have gone farther so as to attain the Christian belief.

> Wordsworthian contemplation can be the first and lowest form of recognition that there is something outside ourselves which demands reverence. To return to Pantheistic errors about the nature of this something would, for a Christian, be very bad. But once again, for "the man coming up from below' the Wordsworthian experience is an advance. Even if he goes no further he has escaped the worst arrogance of materialism: if he goes on he will be converted. ("Christianity and Culture," *Christian Reflections*, p. 22)

For Lewis, aesthetic experiences are initiations to Christian life. For instance, he finds in his devotion to Wagnerian gods foretastes of the devotion to the real God. For one thing, it had "something very like adoration, some kind of quite disinterested self-abandonment to an object which securely claimed this by simply being the object it was." (*Joy*, p. 65) Such adoration and self-abandonment are essential in man's relation to God. Wagnerian gods were the first thing that had him feel anything like religious adoration, because, though he had believed in God when he was a child, he had never understood why the Prayer Book told him to "give thanks to God for His great glory," (*Joy*, p. 65) rather than for any particular benefit God conferred upon man.

Then, he finds that Nature, too, shows him God's glory.—the same Nature that first came to be important for him as a reminder of scenes and characters in *the Nibelung Saga* soon ceased to be a mere reminder and became itself a medium of "Joy". In *The Four Loves* he says,

> Nature never taught me that there exists a God of glory and of infinite majesty...But nature gave the word glory a meaning for me. I still do not know where else I could have found one. (*Four Loves*, p. 23)

Later, he writes that "the beauties of nature" are "a secret God has shared with us alone". (*Malcolm*, p. 18) Animals do not know it. It is only we human beings that feel the glory of God through our senses. Thus, once he has become a believer, he finds his appreciation of Nature to have been a good initiation to Christian life.

Thirdly, his love for Norse mythology, which also became a catalyst of "Joy", has made it easier for him to accept the Christian myth. Lewis later came to believe in Christianity as a myth that has become a fact, and this belief is partly owing to the significance that he has seen in the north mythology. (cf. e.g. "Myth Became Fact," *God*, p. 66)

When we think of "Joy", we may remember that Coleridge has also imaginative aesthetic experiences which he calls "Joy". It is a moment of harmony between man's inner world and the outer: namely, the moment of reconciliation of man and Nature, similar to Wordsworth's "spots of time."

> Joy, Sara! is the Spirit & the Power,
> That wedding Nature to us gives in Dower
> A new Earth & new Heaven
> Undreamt of by the Sensual & the Proud!
> Joy is that strong Voice, Joy that luminous
> Cloud—We, we ourselves rejoice![11]

When we read this, we see that Lewis's "Joy" is different from Coleridge's, though they have the same name. Lewis's "Joy" points to a supernatural Reality, while Coleridge's points to an earthly harmony. Rather, we see that Lewis's "Joy" is more alike to St. Augustine's longing for God as is expressed thus in the saint's *Confessions*,

> The thought of you stirs him [i.e., man] so deeply that he cannot be content unless he praises you, because you made us for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in you.[12]

St. Augustine finds peace in mind for the first time when he has been converted, with the feeling that he at last finds what he has wanted throughout his life. This is exactly the case with Lewis.

‹The Dialectic of Desire›

The reason why Lewis connects "Joy" with God is that it has led him to Christianity. In his

imaginative life, he was always seeking for the source and satisfaction of "Joy." He believed that if he found something that satisfied the desire, it must have been the real object of "Joy." In *The Pilgrim's* Regress, an allegory of Lewis's own spiritual pilgrimage towards Christianity, he describes how he pursued the object and satisfaction of "Joy." In it, John, the protagonist and an allegorical figure of the young Lewis, feels a sudden sweet desire for an island which is seen far away through the window. Strangely, the island appears only occasionally as if it were a mere illusion. One day, at last, he starts off on a journey, looking for the island. He tries one thing after another, not only such sensual pleasures as sex and music but also many types of philosophies that seems likely to be the ultimate reality and therefore to give him ultimate satisfaction, so as to subdue his longing. In that process, anything that is not the true object of the desire betrays its falsity once it is really experienced, even if it has appeared to be the most desirable thing on earth. For instance, on his way, he meets a "brown girl", who says, "It was me you wanted...I am better than your silly Islands." (*Regress*, p. 29) He takes her words for it and embraces her many times. But one morning he suddenly realizes that her appearance is in fact hateful to him and that his object of desire cannot be that girl at all. Similarly, the wrong philosophies reveal their mistakes or insufficiency when they are tried by experience. Lewis calls the process the "dialectic of Desire", holding that:

> The dialectic of Desire, faithfully followed, would retrieve all mistakes, head you off from all false paths, and force you not to propound, but to live through, a sort of ontological proof. (*Regress*, p. 10)

The ontological proof referred here is an apprehensive discrimination of the true object of Joy from false ones. In the *OED*, "dialectic" is defined in the first place as "The art of critical examination into the truth of an opinion; the investigation of truth by discussion." Lewis's "dialectic" is different from the Kantian or Hegelian method of solving or Aufhebung two contradictory characters of the object, and is rather to be taken as "dialectic" in the sense defined as above in the *OED*. The dialectic is usually expected to be logical, and so is the "dialectic of Desire", though proofs that are employed in it are empirical and may make it seem nonlogical. Although what feels "Joy" and acquires the empirical proofs that are to be used as data is not reason but imagination, the dialectic process in which Lewis eliminates wrong objects one by one is systematic and, in that sense, quite logical. The important fact here is that Lewis thinks that imagination as well as reason has the capacity to examine the truth.

In his actual life, Lewis finds first of all that sex alone has never given him lasting contentment, and comes to believe that sex is not the object of "Joy". In a letter dated on 30th January 1930, to Arthur Greeves, who was a lifelong friend and correspondent of Lewis since childhood, he writes of "Joy":

> One knows what a psychoanalyst would say--it is sublimated lust, a kind of defecated masturbation which fancy gives one to compensate for external chastity. Yet after all, why should that be the right way of looking at it? If he can say that *It* is sublimated sex, why is it not open to say that sex is

> undeveloped *It*?—as Plato would have said. And if as Plato thought, the material world is a copy or mirror of the spiritual, then the central feature of the material life (=sex), must be a copy of something in the spirit: and when you get a faint glimpse of the latter, of course you find it like the former: an Original *is* like its copy: a man is like his portrait. (*Letters to Arthur*, pp. 338–339)

His interpretation here is that, though sex gives man pleasure, the sexual pleasure is only a copy of some real pleasure which must exist elsewhere, and because it is a mere copy, it cannot give him real satisfaction but sooner or later reveals its deficiency or irrelevancy. He says,"You might as well offer a mutton chop to a man who is dying of thirst as offer sexual pleasure to the desire I am speaking of...My feeling could rather have been expressed in the words,' Quite. I see. But haven't we wandered from the real point?' Joy is not a substitute for sex; sex is very often a substitute for Joy. I sometimes wonder whether all pleasures are not substitutes for Joy." (*Joy*, pp. 137–138)

After the disillusionment with sexual pleasure, Lewis turned to the occult, mistaking the occult fever for the essence of "Joy". But soon again, he realized that the occult was nothing to do with his "Joy".

When he saw that neither sex nor the occult was the thing he was after, he consciously proceeded to ask himself if "Joy" itself was what he wanted, pretending to be able to answer "Yes." However, it seemed to him that"Joy proclaimed, 'You want—I myself am your want of—something other, outside, not you nor any state of you.'" (*Joy*, p. 176)

Then, he began reading philosophy and, under the influence of Idealism, came to believe in the Absolute, having realized that "we have, so to speak, a root in the Absolute," though he did not think the Absolute existence to be personal. (*Joy*, p. 177) He did not expect any possibility that man should ever encounter "the Absolute." However, when he was praying to it, calling it "the Spirit", he had God's revelation.

> Perhaps, even now, my Absolute Spirit still differed in some way from the God of religion. The real issue was not, or not yet, there. The real terror was that if you seriously believed in even such a "God" or "Spirit" as I admitted, a wholly new situation developed....now a philosophical theorem, cerebrally entertained, began to stir and heave and throw off its gravecloths, and stood upright and became a living presence. I was to be allowed to play at philosophy no longer....He only said, "I am the Lord"; "I am that I am"; "I am". (*Joy*, p. 181)

Lewis says that before his conversion he had always wanted "not to be 'interfered with.'" He says, "I had wanted (mad wish) 'to call my soul my own.'" (*Joy*, p. 182) He was the type who was far more anxious to avoid suffering than to achieve delight. However, God did not allow him to remain his own master.

> I had pretty well known that my ideal of virtue would never be allowed to lead me into anything intolerably painful; I would be "reasonable." But now what had been an ideal became a command....Total surrender, the absolute leap in the dark, were demanded. The reality with which no treaty can made was upon me....In the Trinity Term of 1929 I gave in, and admitted that God was God,

and knelt and prayed: perhaps, that night, the most dejected and reluctant convert in all England. (*Joy*, p. 182)

This personal encounter with God made him believe in the Christian God who is the Creator and Lord of the world.

The fact that Lewis feels as if Joy spoke itself shows the strength of its impression and the autonomy Lewis feels in "Joy". This nature of "Joy" as an autonomous, influential voice must be one of the reasons why he comes to think that it has been given to him from the outside by God to lead him to Christianity. This desire which he calls "Joy" had never been satisfied nor subdued by anything, and neither had he been able to find what this desire was really for. He was just forced to continue his spiritual pursuit. Yet, as he writes in *Surprised by Joy*, after his conversion, "the subject [of Joy] has lost nearly all interest" (*Joy*, p. 190) for him. And he somehow finds this to be a proof that, after all, "Joy" has been the desire for heaven:

It was valuable only as a pointer to something other and outer. While that other was in doubt, the pointer naturally loomed large in my thoughts. When we are lost in the woods the sight of a signpost is a great matter....But when we have found the road and are passing signposts every few miles, we shall not stop and stare. (*Joy*, p. 190)

Now, he regards "Joy" as a foretaste of its pleasures in heaven. "Joy" is, for him, a medium with which to get a glimpse of supernatural reality. He has even come to think that all the pleasures on earth are reflections of those in heaven.

Pleasures are shafts of the glory as it strikes our sensibility. As it impinges on our will or our understanding, we give it different names--goodness or truth or the like. But its flash upon our senses and mood is pleasure. (*Malcolm*, p. 89)

From what has been seen above, we can conclude that imagination for Lewis is a faculty that leads man to God through the ever unsatisfied desire.

It is characteristic of Lewis, by the way, that he thus compares his "Joy" to the signpost for the travellers on earth. As a metaphor, it gives an impression that the object of the longing is God's country, rather than God Himself, because the thing a signpost is pointing at is always a place, not a person. His "Joy" always seems to have been like a yearning for some faraway unknown land. Lewis's early poems in *Spirits in Bondage*, published in 1919, before his conversion to Christianity and before he came to believe in heaven, already show his longing for an unknown paradise. Such expressions as "the rosy West,/ To hide in the deep forests and be for ever at rest/ From the rankling hate of God and the outworn world's decay" ("Ode For New Year's Day," ll. 44–46) (*Spirits*, p. 15), "by the very God, we know, we know/ That somewhere still, beyond the Northern snow/Waiting for us the red-rose gardens blow" ("Songs of the Pilgrims," ll. 64–66) (*Spirits*, p. 49), and "Beyond the western ocean's glow,/ Whither the faerie galleys steer" ("Ballade Mystique," ll. 26–28) (*Spirits*, p. 54) show that Lewis held such yearning

continuously, both when he was positively rejecting God and after he came to believe in God. As is often pointed out,[13] Lewis's idea of "Joy" is strongly influenced by the Platonic idea of anamnesis, or the soul's yearning recollection of heaven which is its real home. In fact, in Lewis's fictions and stories, the motif of "Joy" always appears as that of a longing for God's country. In *The Pilgrim's Regress*, it is expressed as a yearning for a far away island. In the Ransom trilogy, it is Ransom's nostalgic feeling for Perelandra in the heaven. In *the Chronicles of Narnia*, this longing takes the form of a longing for Aslan's country or for Narnia. Then, in *Till We Have Faces*, we see Psyche's yearning for the Gray Mountain where the god lives.

What is also important is the fact that Lewis finds "Joy" to be not only a pointer to heaven, but also a proof of its existence. For, he interprets the fact that nothing on earth seemed to satisfy"Joy" as a proof that it is the desire for something beyond this natural world, that is, for heaven. His reasoning is based on the logic that there cannot be any desire where there is no possible satisfaction:

> A man's physical hunger does not prove that that man will get any bread; he may die of starvation on a raft in the Atlantic. But surely a man's hunger does prove that he comes of a race which repairs its body by eating and inhabits a world where eatable substances exist. In the same way, though I do not believe (I wish I did) that my desire for Paradise proves that I shall enjoy it, I think it a pretty good indication that such a thing exists and that some men will. ("The Weight of Glory," *Toast*, p. 99)

As the words "a pretty good indication" imply, this argument falls short of a logically indisputable proof. It presupposes that everything in the world, including such a desire, has a sufficient reason for its existence, and this presupposition in its turn presupposes a certain Designer of the world, who makes nothing without a purpose. Such a Designer must actually be God. We may criticize Lewis for having his logic fall into the similar mistake as Kant has made in presupposing immortality of soul and existence of God as necessary conditions of the goodness and realization of moral ideal, though, different from Lewis, Kant holds his belief to be only subjective. As we shall see more closely when we discuss Lewis's argument from morality, Kant needs to postulate eternity because in this world, no one in his short lifetime can fulfill all the moral obligations that his conscience perceives and therefore there must be a place where man can fulfill them; and Kant also needs to postulate God because there must be someone who justifies the moral law, giving happiness in heaven, if not on earth, to those who try to obey the law conscientiously.[14] In short, Kant believes that good deeds which are unfulfilled or unrewarded on earth must be fulfilled and rewarded in heaven, and therefore heaven exists. Similarly, Lewis believes his "unsatisfied desire" must be satisfied in heaven, and therefore heaven exists.

In fact, such logic is based on the traditional orthodox belief in the ultimate justice and reasonableness of the universe. However, if we doubt, as Hume does, the ultimate rationality of the universe, there is no necessity that every good deed should bring some reward, or that every desire should have the possibility of satisfaction. Without postulating some righteous Creator or

Designer, it is difficult to believe in such justice or satisfaction as Kant and Lewis conceive. However, Lewis seems to believe that his logic is sound enough to prove the existence of heaven, or at least to substantiate it. Those who do not share this belief in the ultimate rathionality of the universe may not find his logic acceptable, but then they might as well understand it is because of the fundamental difference in the opinion about the logos of the universe that Lewis's logic seems insufficient to them.

‹Lewis's imagination theory compared with Coleridge's Romantic theory of imagination›[15]

Lewis's theory of imagination may be classified as Romantic for it has a lot in common with Coleridge's theory which is a representative of English Romantic theory of imagination in the 19th century. What is especially important is the fact that both hold imagination to be a bridge between the supernatural and us. In *Biographia Literaria*, Coleridge defines the faculty of imagination as follows:

> The IMAGINATION, then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be *the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.* The secondary I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the *kind* of its agency, and differing only in *degree*, and in the *mode* of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate... (the first italics mine)[16]

The primary imagination is here seen as a faculty of perception.

In his marginalia in Tennemann's *Geshichte der Philosophie*, Coleridge has written down a philosophical scale with a note:[17]

Lowest	*Highest*	
Sense	Reason	Fancy and Imagination
Fancy	Imagination	are Oscillations,this
Understanding	Understanding	connecting R[eason]
Understanding	Understanding	and U[nderstanding];
Imagination	Fancy	that connecting Sense
Reason	Sense	and Understanding.

Sense, fancy, understanding, imagination and reason are all a means of perception. They are all employed in the experience of nature and in the recognition of metaphysical truth. Miscellaneous sensations of the physical Senses are not yet knowledge of the external world. They are related in fancy, judged and understood by understanding as a phenomenon, given mental images in imagination, and weighed in relation to the ideas in reason so that they become a part of the whole personal knowledge. Conversely, abstract ideas in reason are understood or conveyed well for the first time when they are given images by imagination.

In Coleridge's system, as is shown above, imagination is the mediatory faculty between

Reason and Understanding. "Understanding" is "the faculty judging according to sense."[18] However, the knowledge through it is limited.

> Its functions supply the rules and constitute the possibility of EXPERIENCE; but remain mere logical forms, except as far as materials are given by the senses or sensations....Of this [i.e.Understanding]...nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu, is strictly true.[19]

Coleridge says, "The UNDERSTANDING, therefore, is the science of phenomena," while "The REASON...is the science of the universal, having the ideas of ONENESS and ALLNESS as its two elements or primary factors."[20]

Between these faculties of reason and understanding, imagination in Coleridge's system operates roughly three ways as the mediatory power: for the first thing, in experience of the physical world, the primary imagination builds images of the external world which has been understood by understanding, and then conveys the images to reason. This building of images of Nature in the mind of man is what Coleridge maintains in *Biographia Literaria* as "a repetition... of the eternal act of creation." In this, the imagination is "the living power", because it is the power of *"natura naturans"* that produces and sustains *"natura naturata"* in mind.[21] Secondly, it discerns beauty, whose essence is harmony, or "Multëity in unity."[22] Besides, it not only discerns unity in multitude, but also has "the effect of reducing multitude to unity."[23] Its mediatory nature in this function lies in the fact that "multëity" is the characteristic of perception through the understanding, while unity or allness is the characteristic of ideas in reason. The imagination as such a power of harmony is also a mark of poetic genius. And thirdly, it conveys metaphysical ideas from reason to the understanding. "An IDEA...cannot be conveyed but by a symbol,"[24] and symbols are works of imagination. Thus, Coleridge calls imagination "that reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the Reason in Images of the Sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the Senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the Reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths, of which they are the conductors."[25] When he says this, it seems even that he sees some mythical eucharistic power in imagination, since the words "consubstantial" and "consubstantiation" especially denote real presence of Christ together with bread and wine in Eucharist. Just as in Eucharist ordinary bread is changed to be "consubstantial" with Christ (who is the Truth), in and through imagination, symbols are made to be consubstntial with the truth. Thus, as the intermediary faculty between reason and the understanding, the primary imagination works to make the external nature into internal thought, and to make internal thought into the external symbols. Therefore, we see that Coleridge and Lewis are of the same opinion that imagination is the power of intuitive perception as well as the power of creation.

However, there is also difference between Lewis's idea of imagination as intuition and Coleridge's. Coleridge sees *imago Dei* even in man's perceptive imagination, which he thinks to be active and creative. Coleridge's idea is expressed in his letter to Thomas Poole on 23 March 1801, where he criticizes Newton for taking human mind always as passive. In his opinion, the

perceiving mind in man is "made in God's Image, & that, too, in the sublimest sense—the Image of the Creator,"[26] as the builder of mental images of "natura naturata."

On the other hand, for Lewis, the intuitive imagination is not God's image but, rather, the passive medium through which God reveals Himself to man from above. In *The Pilgrim's Regress*, God tells John, "For this end I made your senses and for this end your imagination, that you might see My face and live." (*Regress*, p. 171) Man's perceptive imagination is here regarded as a receptive faculty, not any creative faculty in the image of God the Creator.

This lack of the idea of *imago Dei* in Lewis comes from his consciousness of radical difference between man's life and divine life. Jesus is the only one who is a Man and yet shares the God's life as the Son. In *Mere Christianity*, Lewis insists on this difference. Man is "made" while the Son is begotten; and, just as a man's artifact does not share human life while his son inherits his human life, man, as an artifact of God, does not partake the same kind of life with God the Maker. Our natural self is not *imago Dei* even though we can be sons of God as regenerated "new men" (*Mere Christianity*, p. 181) when we wish and continuously try, with God's assistance, to be like the Son of God both in will and in behaviour. (*Mere Christianity*, pp. 157–159)

Lewis and Coleridge are different also in their idea of relation between reason and imagination. Coleridge attributes the power of "an Inward Beholding" of the "Spiritual" to reason.[27] In Coleridge's system, imagination does not perceive the spiritual truth directly but receives it through reason. However, in Lewis, imagination itself has the direct receptive capacity for divine revelation.

In Lewis's system, both reason and imagination directly concern themselves with divine reality, and that, in different ways. Lewis's imagination is not opposite of reason nor in a lower position than it, but works side by side with reason, showing God's reality to man.



* As an intuition into the relation between language and reality, imagination also works to make logical thinking possible by giving language activities meanings, about which we shall discuss in the next section.

Now, we have seen that Lewis's idea of imagination as intuitive power is similar to Coleridge's idea of "primary imagination", though they are not the same. Yet it is not the only similarity between their imagination theory. Lewis's idea of imagination as creative power is

similar to Coleridge's of his "secondary imagination." Lewis says that creative activity in man's imaginative mind has "something that bears a faint resemblance" (*Miracles*, p. 36) to God's creation of Nature, as Coleridge holds the secondary imagination to be an echo of the primary imagination. Besides, as Coleridge holds that the secondary imagination is so limited in its creative power that it needs some materials that it "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create," Lewis is also conscious of the inferiority of man's creative power to that of God.

> We fall short of creation in two ways. In the first place we can only re-combine elements borrowed from the real universe: no one can imagine a new primary colour or a sixth sense. In the second place, what we imagine exists only for our own consciousness--though we can, by words, induce other people to build for themselves pictures in their own minds which may be roughly similar to it. (*Miracles*, pp. 36–47)

As can be seen above, the differences Lewis sees between God's creation and man's are both in the "mode of operation" and in "degree," which are exactly what Coleridge finds when he compares the "secondary imagination" to the "primary", that is, to the repetition of God's creation. Especially important is the fact that they both hold man's creative power of imagination to be synthetic and not capable of creating *ex nihilo*.

When we consider Lewis's idea of creative imagination, especially when we consider it in the context of the problem of man's relation to God, we see that Lewis even denies that man can ever be original in his imaginative activity. He says, "In the New Testament the art of life itself is an art of imitation....'Originality' in the New Testament is quite plainly the prerogative of God alone...The duty and happiness of every other being is placed in being derivative, in reflecting like a mirror." ("Christianity and Literature," *Christian Reflections*, p. 6) The faculty of man's creative imagination is thus mimetic. This limitation shows us our status and duty as God's creatures. Man's art is valuable only as reflection of God's creation.

‹Imagination as the organ of meaning›

We have already seen that "Joy" in his imaginative life leads Lewis to belief in heaven, which he considers to be the Real World. And in this sense, Lewis finds our imagination to be a faculty to show us Reality.

In this section, we shall see that there is yet another sense in which Lewis sees imagination as a Faculty for grasping Reality. As we have seen, he says, "pleasures are shafts of the glory as it strikes our sensibility." (*Malcolm*, p. 89) Aesthetic pleasures are, for him, a concrete objectivity which comes from God and shows us His magnificence through our sensibility. In Lewis's opinion, this "sensibility" is, as the receptacle of aesthetic pleasures, a faculty connected to imagination. Not only spiritual pleasures but also sensual ones convey meanings, and it is by imagination that those meanings are apprehended.

In a sense, he is the same as Kant who regards aesthetic sensations as a kind of sensuous perception which is the ground of all knowledge. Kant sometimes uses the word *"ästhetisch"* as a

synonym of "intuitive" and (probably from the Greek αισθητικος = aesthetic, sensitive; αισθησις = sense, sensation) as a near synonym of "sensuous", especially when it refers to apprehensive, intuitive recognition of the outer world which gives data to the faculty of logical thinking which, in turn, synthesizes such "æsthetisch" data to get comprehensive understanding.[28] For Kant, however, as for many people today, aesthetic perception is a matter of subjectivity. For instance, he says in *"Über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen"*:

> Die verschiedene Empfindungen des Vergnügens, oder des Verdrusses, beruhen nicht so sehr auf der Beschaffenheit der äußeren Dinge die sie erregen, als auf das jedem Menschen eigene Gefühl, dadurch mit Lust oder Unlust gerührt zu werden.
>
> (The various feelings of enjoyment or of displeasure rest not so much upon the nature of the external things that arouse them as upon each person's own disposition to be moved by these to pleasure or pain.)[29]

It is significant that Lewis's case is just the opposite. Lewis is an objectivist. He holds that aesthetic sensation is given directly from God, and therefore it has an objectivity derived from the real objectivity of its source. It gives us direct information of heaven. He says that as we do not hear the roar of wind merely as a meaningless noise but knows the wind from it, so it is "possible to 'read' as well as to 'have' a pleasure."

> The distinction ought to become, and sometimes is, impossible; to receive it and to recognise its divine source are a single experience...This sweet air whispers of the country from whence it blows. It is a message. (*Malcolm*, pp. 89–90)

Lewis regards the 20th century as an age which is dominated by scientific way of thinking when ordinary people tend to believe that everything that exists can be proved by science. The belief that science proves everything will lead to the idea that nothing which cannot be known or proved by science is real, and hence to deny objectivity of such metaphysical meanings as found in aesthetic pleasures. He points out, while admitting that science is important and useful as a means to know facts about the world, what science shows us is short of the comprehensive reality. For instance, "Why is there a universe?" "Why does it go on as it does?" or "Has it any meaning?" is not a question science can possibly answer. (*Mere Christianity*, p. 31) Since he believes in the metaphysical intelligibility of the universe, he thinks that the true philosophy must be the one that gives an answer to the question as to the ground of the existence of the world and human beings. In his opinion, therefore, the comprehensive reality is to be approached not only with science but also with metaphysics and theology.

> The deeply ingrained habit of truncated thought—what we call the "scientific" habit of mind—was indeed certain to lead to Naturalism, unless this tendency were continually corrected from some other source...men of science were coming to be metaphysically and theologically uneducated. (*Miracles*, p.

46)

Then, on this awareness of insufficiency of the scientific materialistic view of the universe, he finds the validity of the medieval, Ptolemaic model of the universe as strong as that of scientific one. The older mythical model of the universe is a work of imagination, but it is no less true for that. On the contrary, if the metaphysical meanings of the world are ever to be attained, they should be attained and expressed by imagination: for Lewis regards imagination as "the organ of meaning" while taking reason as "the organ of truth." ("Bluspels and Flalansferes," *Selected Essays*, p. 265.) The older model is an attempt to combine the metaphysical reality of the universe with the physical truth about it, and in a sense even more comprehensive than the new scientific one.

Besides, he is aware that, it is only a modern tendency to see the scientific view of the universe as if it were the only truth. He says,

> In every age it will be apparent to accurate thinkers that scientific theories...are never statement of fact. That stars appear to move in such and such ways, or that substances behaved thus and thus in the laboratory—these are statements of fact. The astronomical or chemical theory can never be more than provisional. (*Discarded*, pp. 15–16)

Ever since he was fascinated by Norse mythology when he was a child, he has felt profound significance in the world of mythology in general. Therefore, it seems natural that he finds profound meanings also in the Old Western world picture with all its mythological bearings, especially after he has read much of medieval and Renaissance literature.

He holds that the medieval model of the world expresses reality in a different way but no less truly than science, and that, probably under influence of G.K. Chesterton, especially of his *The Everlasting Man*. Lewis acknowledges the book as the one which has enabled him to see "for the first time...the whole Christian outline of history set out in a form that seemed...to make sense." (*Joy*, p. 178) Chesterton says in defence of primitive mythology,

> Moreover, even where the fables are inferior as art, they cannot be properly judged by science; still less properly judged as science. Some myths are very crude and queer like the early drawings of children; but the child is trying to draw. It is none the less an error to treat his drawing as if it were a diagram, or intended to be a diagram. The student cannot make a scientific statement about the savage, because the savage is not making a scientific statement about the world. He is saying something quite different; what might be called the gossip of the gods. We may say, if we like, that it is believed before there is time to examine it.[30]

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When we consider his idea of imagination as "the organ of meaning", it should be noted that besides being the intuitive power of metaphysical meanings, there is yet another sense in which he calls imagination as "the organ of meaning". Lewis sees imagination as the base of all

linguistic activities without which even no logical thinking can stand. In "Bluspels and Flalansferes", he argues that man is not capable of carrying out purely abstract thinking and therefore has to use some metaphor or analogy whenever he is to think of something beyond his sensual experience. ("Bluspels," pp. 264–265)

Lewis presents two cases where metaphors are necessary. The first is when we try to express something we ourselves do not understand clearly. The second case is when we try to explain something that we clearly know to those who do not know it. In both cases, without being accompanied by some mental images, the idea remains not only abstract but actually nonsense, and it is imagination that builds mental images with metaphors and analogies so as to concretely express ideas about something unknown by comparison to something clearly known. Therefore, imagination is necessary to acquire knowledge about something beyond sensual experiences. In the case of things within our experiences, we may directly perceive them, but still, he says, "When we pass beyond pointing to individual sensible objects, when we begin to think of causes, relations, of mental states or acts, we become incurably metaphorical." ("Bluspels," p. 263)

Lewis is thus aware of importance of metaphors and figures in conceptual thinking, and critical about such philosophers as Kant and Spinoza on the ground that their writings are too abstract to have any real meaning. ("Bluspels," pp. 264–265) He makes much more of Plato as"the great creators of metaphor, and therefore...the masters of meaning." ("Bluspels," p. 265) Since Lewis holds that metaphorical thinking is more meaningful than abstract thinking, he even says, for example, that "a man who says heaven and thinks of the visible sky is pretty sure to mean more than a man who tells us that heaven is a state of mind." ("Bluspels," p. 265) Of course, he does not say that all the metaphorical ideas acquired through imagination are physical truth. He says,

> ...it must not be supposed that I am in any sense putting forward the imagination as the organ of truth. We are not talking of truth, but of meaning: meaning which is the antecedent condition both of truth and falsehood, whose antithesis is not error but nonsense. I am a rationalist. For me, reason is the natural organ of truth; but imagination is the organ of meaning. Imagination, producing new metaphors or revivifying old, is not the cause of truth, but its condition. ("Bluspels," p. 265)

Today, fifty years after Lewis's "Bluspels and Flalansferes" was first published in 1939, the idea of imagination as the organ of meaning is proposed again in the field of literary criticism by Colin Falck in his *Myth, Truth and Literature* (1989). Between Lewis and Falck, there have been Soussurian literary theory, Structuralism and post-Stracturalism which concentrate on logical or scientific analyses of the text and neglect to ask questions as to how literary texts and language relate to the dimension of reality. Falck argues against this tendency of modern literary criticisms, insisting that they should consider the function of imagination that relates sensory perceptions to the language system by giving meanings to sense data:

> The notion of the emerging of meaning is almost entirely unmarked in our serious thinking, and tends instead to be confined to the—philosophically disreputable—level of folk-wisdom or religious superstition in the form of such notions as "intuition," "hunch," "presentiment," or " sixth sense."...Language... rises out of, and must continue to rest on, this level of pre-linguistic awareness of other presences—both animate and inanimate—which co-exist with us in the world around us.
>
> All consciousness, we could say, is oriented towards meaning in this fundamental sense, and can only come into existence through the meaning which reveals itself, or is revealed, in this primary process of meaning-creation. It is in fact the revelation of some meaning in reality which makes consciousness possible. This purposiveness, or orientation to meaning, is a pre-subjective and pre-objective intentionality which lies below the level of thought and of the conscious intentions of ordinary life.[31]

This is almost the same as what Lewis says above. Lewis's argument has not become out of date but still throws light on the problem of the alienation of the literary criticisms from the dimension of reality.

What makes Lewis think of imagination as "the organ of meaning" is his belief in the validity of its intuitive power. It is only as long as the analogies and metaphors are proper that they serve well for the meaning, and it is only when imagination has real power to apprehend the essence of things that the analogies and metaphors will be proper:

> if those original equations, between good and light, or evil and dark, between breath and soul and all the others, were from the beginning arbitrary and fanciful...then all our thinking is nonsensical. But we cannot...believe it to be nonsensical. ("Bluspels," p. 265)

Lewis can say this because he assumes that all our thinking more or less depends on some metaphor. Otherwise, he might as well think that our thinking may be reasonable even when our metaphorical thinking is nonsensical. And thus, Lewis holds imagination as capable of gaining insight not only into facts but further into reality.

He admits that sometimes, even when the rational thought is correct, mental images that accompany that thought may fall short of reality. For instance, Lewis says that when he thinks about London, he usually has a mental picture of Euston Station. He may speak of the population of London with this picture in mind, but it does not follow that he thinks several millions of people live in that station. (*Miracles*, pp. 72–84) Thus, he does not hold that imagination is infallible. Yet from the belief in the validity of human thought in general, he draws the conclusion that long-enduring traditional metaphors are valid and truly illuminating.

In the idea of imagination as "the organ of meaning", Lewis owes much to Owen Barfield, a lifelong friend of Lewis since their student days at Oxford and the author of *Poetic Diction.* Around the time between 1928 and 1932 Lewis and Barfield held a long enthusiastic debate on imagination, and Lewis acknowledges the influence he has got from Barfield thus: "I think he changed me a good deal more than I him. Much of the thought which he afterwards put into *Poetic Diction* had already mine before that important little book appeared." (*Joy*, p. 161)

In the book Barfield argues as follows:

> poetic, and apparently "metaphorical' values were latent in meaning from the beginning...that the earliest words in use were "the names of sensible, material objects' and nothing more...you must suppose that they were not, as they appear to be at present, isolated, or detached, from thinking and feeling. Afterwards, in the development of language and thought, these single meanings split up into contrasted pairs--the abstract and concrete, particular and general, objective and subjective.[32]

His point is that even the meanings of those words which seem purely abstract or metaphorical now were concrete and literal in their origin. Though the figurative origin of a word tends to be forgotten in the course of time, and the word will come to appear as a pure concept, its figurative origin will keep its influence on the meaning of the word, never allowing it to be purely abstract in fact. Here, it is imagination that originally finds adequate figures for the things or concepts to be expressed.

Lionel Aday reported from the letters between Lewis and Barfield that at first Lewis "insistently maintained, that truth or falsehood can be predicated only of intellectual judgements, never of things imagined."[33] Yet afterwards he came to admit "to having under-estimated importance [of metaphor]. In so far as metaphor brings before the mind images or representations of objects, metaphor, he agrees, gives life to abstractions otherwise lifeless."[34] Furthermore, as Adey points out, he continued to insist that imagination conveyed meaning, not truth. Nevertheless he based his fiction...In the assumption that divine truth enters the human psyche via myth, dream or other manifestation of imagination."[35]

It must be admitted that the general validity of metaphor as an expression of reality is not a universally accepted truth but remains ingenious intuition of Lewis or of Barfield. It is based on the belief in the validity of human thought which is based on verbal activity, and the validity of such human thought is today regarded as open to question. Yet, Leweis's belief in the validity of metaphor is important for him as a literary man, especially because it has a great influence on his attitude towards allegory and myth. We shall see in the next section that since he believes such traditional analogies as between good and light or between evil and the dark to be true, he also believes that traditional allegory and mythology reveal some metaphysical reality.

‹Allegory, Symbolism, Sacramentalism and Myth›

Coleridge does not make much of allegory. He says it is "but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses; the principal being more worthless even than its phantom proxy, both alike unsubstantial, and former shapeless to boot,"[36] while he highly values symbolism, regarding symbols as "consubstantial with the truths." However, to Lewis, allegory means much more.

In *Allegory of Love*, Lewis defines "allegory" in contrast to "symbolism". His way of contrasting them is, however, different from Coleridge's. Lewis difines allegory as an attempt to express something immaterial in the form of personification: to embody, for example, love or two opposite views in *bellum intestinum* in human figures; while symbolism is an attempt to grasp and express things beyond our sensual experiences. Allegory and symbolism differ in that

the author of allegory expresses what he knows, since his figures are fictions or copies of human feelings, while the symbolist is trying to grasp the yet unexperienced Real World which can be revealed only through symbols. For the symbolist, it is we and our world that are copies of the Real World. Lewis says, "Symbolism is a mode of thought, but allegory is a mode of expression." (*Allegory*, p. 48) Allegory aims at revealing the reality of things indescribable otherwise. Lewis says,

> All good allegory exists not to hide but to reveal; to make the inner world more palpable by giving it an (imagined) concrete embodiment. (*Regress*, p. 13)

On the other hand, however, when Lewis says allegory is a mode of expression and that the author of allegory knows what he is writing about, he does not mean that allegorical figures are arbitrary. What is expressed by allegory is the reality and essence of things and feelings, which are, in a sense, given to the author. The allegorical codes such as giants, dragons, paradise, etc. are not chosen by him but somehow imposed on him. And it is revelation not only to the readers but to the author himself. He does not create or invent allegorical figures in the same sense as a modern novelist does his characters. Nor does he aim at novelty or something specific. Allegories are expressions of the universal.

About the allegorical embodiments, Lewis says that "they are more like words--the words of a language which speaks the else unspeakable—than they are like the people and places in a novel. To give them radically new characters is not so much original as ungrammatical." (*Preface*, p. 57) Likewise as figures in metaphor, embodiments or personifications in allegory are also attained through imagination. They are logically undemonstratable in essence. Lewis says, "when allegory is at its best, it approaches myth which must be grasped with the imagination, not with the intellect." (*Regress*, p. 13)

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As for myth, then, Lewis regards it as something above allegory. Allegory is basically some expression of what the author knows, though its traditional codes hold more significance than he knows. On the other hand, the meanings of myth is totally out of the author's control. In Lewis's opinion, what is expressed in myth is divine metaphysical reality. Myth comes to the author as a real revelation since it expresses "what he does not yet know and cd. [sic] not come by in any other way." (*Letters*, p. 271)

In his idea of allegory and myth, Lewis has again been much influenced by Owen Barfield. In *Poetic Diction* Barfield places myth above allegory in its revelatory capacity:

> The distinction between true and false metaphor corresponds to the distinction between Myth and Allegory, allegory being a more or less conscious hypostatization of ideas, followed by a synthesis of them, and myth the true child of Meaning, begotten on imagination.... The modern poet has created a new myth or made a true use of an old one, according as the myth in question is the direct embodiment of concrete experience and not of his idea of that experience—in which case he has only invented an

allegory, or made an allegorical use of a myth, as the case may be.[37]

Here in Barfield, myth is regarded as something quite beyond the narrator's control, as it is thought "the direct embodiment of concrete experience" or the true revelation of the concrete Reality. It is to be apprehended by imagination and should be accepted as it is.

Lewis's idea of myth can be seen most clearly in *The Pilgrim's Regress* where God tells John, the allegorical figure of the young Lewis:

> The words of Wisdom are also myth and metaphor: but since they do not know themselves for what they are, in them the hidden myth is master, where it should be servant: and it is but of man's inventing. But this is My inventing. This is the veil under which I have chosen to appear even from the first until now. (*Regress*, p. 171)

What is said here is that words used in science and those in myth are similarly metaphorical in their origin, and that mythical words are above scientific ones in that they are conscious of their own origin, knowing how their original meaning is influencing the reader's imagination. It is also said that the myth of Christianity is truly revelational because it is God's own myth.

Actually, even in pagan mythology, Lewis recognizes some significant truth foreshadowing Christianity. For example, the myth of the fertility god who dies and is reborn every year is understood as a herald of the Son's Death and Resurrection. Hence, he calls Christianity as "Myth [which] became Fact." ("Myth Became Fact," *God*, p. 63)

> My present view...would be that just as, on the factual side, a long preparation culminates in God's becoming incarnate as Man, so, on the documentary side, the truth first appears in mythical form and then by a long process of condensing or focusing finally becomes incarnate as History. This involves the belief that Myth in general is not merely misunderstood history... nor priestly lying...but, at its best, a real though unfocused gleam of divine truth falling on human imagination. (*Miracles*, pp. 137–138n.)

Besides, Lewis is conscious of the limit of language in expressing reality, and thinks that pictorial and mythical presentation sometimes conveys the reality better. He says, "...all words except proper names are general—too general ever to be exactly right." (*Spenser's*, p. 115) In Perelandra, the second of his space trilogy, the hero finds difficulty in describing what he saw on the planet Venus. Then,

> [I]t is words that are vague. The reason why the thing can't be expressed is that it's too definite for language. (*Perelandra*, p. 33)

Reality loses some of its truth when reduced to words. In this respect, myth is a better way of communicating reality, but then it is to be received in whole, by way of imagination. Rational interpretation of myth does not reveal Reality better than myth itself. Lewis wrote to Arthur Greeves on 18th October 1931:

> The 'doctrines' we get out of the true myth are of course less true: they are translations into our concepts and ideas of that wh. [sic] God has already expressed in a language more adequate, namely the actual incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection. (*Letters to Arthur*, p. 428)

He says, "What flows into you from the myth is not truth but reality (truth is always about something, but reality is about which truth is." ("Myth Became Fact," *God*, p. 66) In fact, it is only those stories which reveal metaphysical reality that Lewis calls "myth". If a story fails to call our attention to such reality, or the Real World, Lewis does not see it as a myth even when it is generally accepted as such.

In *An Experiment in Criticism*, Lewis goes even so far as to define myths by their effect on the reader. According to Lewis, a myth is first of all extra-literary, that is, its story has a value and moving power in itself, independent of the style and quality of its narrative. Secondly, it introduces the reader to a permanent, rather than temporal, object of contemplation. Thirdly, the story is to be preternatural, and the reader never projects himself into the characters. Finally, the experience of reading a myth is always grave and awe-inspiring. It is numinous. He says that the same story may be a myth to one man and not to another because the effect of the same book is not always the same on different readers. Therefore, there are those who never read stories as myths.

As he thus defines myths by their effects rather than the author's intention, he may be regarded as a forerunner of receptionist literary critics. Yet he concentrates on the reader probably because he believes that myth reveals reality even when the author does not know it, not because he thinks all kinds of texts and narratives are infinitely open or because there are no fixed meanings in literary works. He writes to C. S. Kilby on 7th May 1959.

> If every good and perfect gift comes from the Father of Light then all true and edifying writing, whether in scripture or not, must be in some sense inspired....Inspiration may operate in a wicked man without his knowing it, and he can then utter...the truth he does not intend. (*Letters*, p. 287)

Besides, the literature he highly values, such as medieval poetry and allegory, is often anonymous or written by plural writers as is the case with *The Romance of the Rose* that Lewis discusses in *Allegory of Love*.

In *An Experiment in Criticism*, which is a book on literary criticism, Lewis does not preach any of his religious convictions about myth. However, when he defines myth thus by the effect on the reader, those who, like us, know his belief that myth is a form of divine revelation may as well see his warning against our missing God's messages because of our inattention. Imagination is capable of receiving God's revelation, but when it is in the wrong condition, it would take any revelational myth as no more than an ordinary story.

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Lewis's ideas of symbolism and sacramentalism are expressed most clearly in

"Transposition", originally a sermon given at Mansfield College, Oxford, where he explains sacramentalism by the concept of what he calls "Transposition".

Lewis distinguishes symbolism and sacramentalism as this: when there is complete discontinuity between the things and the signs that denote them, it is symbolism. For example, the relation between speech and writing is one of symbolism. "The one is simply a sign of the other and signifies it by a convention." ("Transposition", *Toast*, p. 83) On the other hand, when the thing signified is really in a certain mode present in the sign, Lewis calls it sacramentalism. An example is painting. The sunlight in a picture, for instance, is not related to the real sunlight simply as the written words are to the spoken. "The suns and lamps in pictures...seem to shine a great deal because they really shine a little in reflecting their archetypes." ("Transposition," p. 83)

Lewis's idea of sacramentalism is similar to Coleridge's idea of symbolism. Coleridge holds that "a Symbol...is characterized by a translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative."[38] Symbolism here is seen not only as true operation of intuitive imagination but also some mystic, eucharistic revelation of reality.

The Transposition as a mode of expression occurs whenever a thing in a richer system is expressed or translated in a poorer system: for example, when a three-dimensional world is drawn on a flat, two-dimensional sheet of paper, or when an orchestra piece is re-written into a piano version. In such cases, one single shape or note in the poorer medium has to express more than two forms or notes of the richer original. In a picture, an acute angle may represent what is also an acute angle in the actual world, or it may represent, in perspective, a right angle. A triangle in a picture may represent an actual triangle or a dunce's cap.

This idea of "Transposition", together with the idea of sacramentalism, is theologically important to Lewis, as it concerns man's capacity for perceiving Reality. When Transposition is made, "what is happening in the lower medium can be understood only if we know the higher medium." ("Transposition," p. 82) Suppose a person had been living in a two-dimensional world all his life, he would not understand our three-dimensional world correctly when he sees it drawn on the paper. On paper, it is full of lines. And when he is told that the three-dimensional world does not consist of pencilled lines, all he could understand would be the negative fact of its lack of lines. Thus, if one tries to describe or to understand the higher dimensional world from below, one has to employ many negatives, though, actually, the higher dimensional world is more real and more visible than the lower. By an analogy, therefore, Lewis thinks it impossible for us to comprehend God or our spiritual life in heaven, because God and heaven must necessarily be in a higher dimension than the world we now live in. Then, he further believes "that this doctrine of Transposition provides for most of us a background very much needed for the theological virtue of Hope:" ("Transposition," p. 86.)

"We know not what we shall be"; but we may be sure we shall be more, not less, than we were on earth.

> Our natural experiences (sensory, emotional, imaginative) are only like the drawing, like pencilled lines on flat paper. If they vanish in the risen life, they will vanish... not as a candle flame that is put out but as a candle flame which becomes invisible because someone has pulled up the blind, thrown open the shutters, and let in the blaze of the risen sun. ("Transposition," pp. 89–90)

With such an idea of sacramentalism in the light of the doctrine of Transposition, he believes that our earthly life reflects our life in heaven by already holding a part of it.

> For we are told in one of the creeds that the Incarnation worked "not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the Manhood into God." And it seems to me that there is a real analogy between this and what I have called Transposition. ("Transposition," p. 91)

In these ideas of sacramentalism and Transposition, we learn what limitation and capacity Lewis sees in the human imagination. It falls short of comprehending Reality as it is, but capable of guessing what it would be like in heaven by the analogical thinking of sacramentalism and Transposition.

Notes

1. Marcel Proust, *À la recherche du tempus perdu*, Vol. I (Gallimard, 1987) pp. 44–45; The translation, *Remembrance of Things Past*, Vol. I, *Swann's Way*, tr. C. K. Scott Moncrieff (The Modern Library, 1928), p. 62.
2. William Wordsworth, *The Prelude*, ed. Ernest de Salincourt (Oxford Univ. Press, 1926), p. 436.
3. Wordsworth, p. 468.
4. James Joyce, *Stephen Hero* (Jonathan Cape, 1944), p. 218.
5. M. H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism* (Norton, 1971), p. 68.
6. Abrams, p. 3319.
7. T. S. Eliot, "The Dry Salvages, V," *Four Quartets*, in *The Complete Poems and Plays of T. S. Eliot* (Faber, 1969), p. 190.
8. Abrams, 322.
9. Marcel Proust, *À la recherche du tempus perdu*, Vol. III (Gallimard, 1983), pp. 870–871; The translation, *Remembrance of Things Past*, Vol. III, tr. C. K. Scott Moncrieff, Terence Kilmartin, and Andreas Mayor (1981; rpt. Penguin, 1989), pp. 903–904.
10. ジョルジュ・プーレ『増補版人間的時間のの研究』序論井上究一郎訳（筑摩書房, 1969), pp. 26–29.
11. S. T. Coleridge, from a Verse Letter to Sera Hutchinson, 4 April, 1802, *Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, Vol. II. 1801–1806, ed. Leslie Griggs (Oxford Univ. Press, 1956), p. 798.
12. St. Augustine, *The Confessions*, tr. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Penguin, 1961; rpt. 1971), p. 21.
13. cf. for example, Lee Alan Brewer, "The Anthropology of Choice," Diss. Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary 1989, pp. 83–84; プラトン『パイドロス』藤沢令夫訳, 岩波文庫, 1967, 248A–250B, pp. 62–69.
14. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der practischen Vernunft, Werke II*, herausgegeben von Karl Vorländer (Felix Meiner, 1906), p. 160.
15. cf. besides Coleridge's own works, esp.

Owen Barfield, *What Coleridge Thought* (Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1971); James D. Boulgher, *Coleridge as Religious Thinker* (Yale Univ. Press, 1961); and John Spencer Hill, *Imagination in Coleridge* (Macmillan, 1978).

16. Coleridge, *The Collected Works*, Vol. VII, *Biographia Literaria*, I, eds. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate (Princeton Univ. Press, 1983), p. 304.
17. Coleridge, *Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century*, ed. R. F. Brinkley. (1955; Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 693–694; quoted in Hill, *Imagination in Coleridge*, p. 177.
18. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, (1825; rept. G. Bell and Sons, 1913), p. 143.
19. Coleridge, *The Statesman's Manual* in *The Collected Works*, Vol. VI, *Lay Sermons* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1972) p. 59 & p. 67.
20. Coleridge, *The Statesman's Manual*, pp. 59–60.
21. Barfield, *What Coleridge Thought*, p. 80.
22. Coleridge, *Biographia*, II, p. 23, note.
23. Coleridge, *Biographia*, II, p. 23.
24. Coleridge, *Biographia*, I, p. 156.
25. Coleridge, *The Statesman's Manual*, p. 29.
26. Coleridge, *Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, Vol. II, 1801–1806, ed. Earl Leslie Griggs (Oxford Univ. Press), p. 709.
27. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, p. 148.
28. cf. Kant, *Kritic der Reinen Vernunft*, herausgegeben von Raymund Schmidt (Felix Meiner, 1956), p. 11.
29. Kant, *Werke I: Vorkritische Schriften bis 1768* (Insel-Verlag, 1960), p. 825: English translation by John T. Goldthwait, *Observations On the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1960; rpt. Univ. of California Press, 1981), p. 45.
30. G. K. Chesterton, *The Everlasting Man* (Image Book, 1908), p. 105.
31. Colin Falck, *Myth, Truth and Literature* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 15; 37.
32. Owen Barfield, *Poetic Diction*, 2nd ed. (1952; Wesleyan Univ. Press, paperbacks, 1984), p. 85.
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